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TITLE: “Loyalty to Nature: Royce’s Latent Environmental Philosophy” 
 
ABSTRACT (95 words): This article surveys recent attempts to articulate the latent environmental philosophy of Josiah 
Royce in order to orient it within the context of contemporary methodologies of environmental ethics. It then articulates a 
unique perspective of loyalty to nature founded on a Roycean appeal to moral perfectionism and his response to the 
egoism of Friedrich Nietzsche. As shall be demonstrated, loyalty to nature provides a novel pragmatic alternative to the 
anthropocentric-biocentric axiology and a richer more comprehensive view of humanity’s relationship to fellow natural 
beings, the land, the planet, and nature itself. 
TEXT (8668 (body)/9425 (inc. notes & references) words):  
 This article surveys recent attempts to articulate the latent environmental philosophy of Josiah Royce (Selk 1977, 
Oppenheim 1999, Price 1999, Bell 1999, Minteer 2001, and Brunson 2016) and assess the merits and flaws of these 
attempts. It will then orient Royce's latent environmental philosophy within the context of contemporary methodologies of 
environmental ethics in the hopes of demonstrating Royce's relevance and potential to these engagements of current 
ecological crises. It will conclude by articulating a unique perspective of loyalty to nature founded on a Roycean appeal to 
moral perfectionism, his response to the egoism of Friedrich Nietzsche, and a blending of the sources presented at the 
outset. As shall be demonstrated, loyalty to nature provides a novel pragmatic alternative to the anthropocentirc-biocentric 
axiology and a richer more comprehensive view of humanity's relationship to fellow natural beings, the land, the planet, 
and nature itself.   
Loyalty to the Land: Royce's Latent Environmental Philosophy:  
 Presently, only a handful of sustained analyses of Royce's latent environmental philosophy exist. Eugene E. Selk 
(1977) contends Royce’s theories of the self, loyalty, and community provide resources for an environmental ethic based 
on obligations to future generations. Meanwhile, the most interesting sources are in a special volume of The Personalist 
Forum on "The 'Conception of God' Debate and the Relevance of Royce" (1999). In it, Frank M. Oppenheim discusses the 
general influence of naturalism on Royce's understanding of spirituality, Thomas W. Price explains how Royce's 
panpsychism allows for natural beings to participate in Royce's social philosophy, and Jason M. Bell argues that loyalty to 
loyalty entails loyalty to nature because "Environmentalism is a loyalty, that is to say, to the relationships that exist, have 
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existed, and will exist between the personal beings in nature... and it is a recognition that these relationships form a 
community of which we are a part” (“The World and Its Selves” 171). More recently, Ben A. Minteer (2001) appeals to 
Royce's concept of the wise province by highlighting the work of Benton MacKaye, specifically his vision of the 
Appalachian Trail and his contributions to the American wilderness idea and most recently Daniel J. Brunson (2016) 
argues that sustainability is a consequence of Royce's moral vision.  
Eugene E. Selk (1977) initiates the first examination of Royce’s environmental philosophy by insisting Royce’s 
beloved community serves as a robust example of what Martin Goulding describes as a moral community bound by a 
social idealism, rather than merely contract or reciprocity (“Towards an Environmental Ethic” 254-255). Initially, our 
obligation to the community and, by extension to future generations, springs from our obligations to our self. Thus Selk 
begins by focusing on Royce’s understanding of the relationship between the self and community and highlights three 
vital components, specifically Royce’s “(1) theory of ‘contrast-effect,’ (2) the essential voluntarism of the self, and (3) the 
self as a time process” (256). All of these components support obligations for future generations. We become who we are 
through our contrast with others, including those of past and future generations, and our mature self emerges when we 
voluntarily commit to “some unifying and organizing principle,… a personal ideal or life plan” and the temporal nature of 
the self requires us to honor the traditions of the past community members and to worry about our impact on subsequent 
members (256-258). Thus, a true community obtains when the members are able to extend the community through time 
by working “constantly on improving the understanding between its members” and share a common past and future as a 
result (259-260). These actions produce rich communities that “display continuity and coherence” and allow their 
members to achieve “full personhood” (261).  
Some of the most interesting work on the subject appears in a special issue of The Personalist Forum on “The 
‘Conception of God” Debate and the Relevance of Royce,” where several critics highlight the influence of nature on 
Royce’s thought. Frank M. Oppenheim (1999) asserts that Royce’s “ethico-rational spirituality” is grounded in a 
naturalism that emphasizes the importance of human transaction with nature. According to Oppenheim, Royce’s 
spirituality “embraced naturalism’s view of the human person as an evolving organism” yet, resisted “any naturalism that 
excludes a transcendent Spirit” (“The Middle Royce’s Naturalistic Spirituality” 131). This concern emerges from Royce’s 
“keen opposition toward nominalism and its consequent materialistic naturalism” and it informs Royce’s development 
during his middle period, particularly his Gifford Lectures on natural religion, i.e. The World and the Individual (1899) 
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(132-141). As a result, Royce constructs a form of spirituality that recognizes that the “human Self lives as an embodied 
biological organism, called to adapt to its changing environment” yet “presupposes that an immanent and transcendent 
Spirit is present and operating in the appeal-making, truth-seeking human Self, to give it light and to confirm its true 
judgements by Its co-witnessing to the finite, human Self” (“The Middle Royce’s Naturalistic Spirituality” 141-142; The 
World as Will and the Individual, Vol. 2 251-52). 
 In the same volume, Thomas W. Price (1999) presents an article that further explicates the influence of nature on 
Royce’s thoughts. He articulates a reading of Royce’s “social philosophy of nature” from the second series of Royce’s 
Gifford Lectures that alludes to the “possibility of social contact and communication with natural beings” (“The 
Appreciation of Natural Beings” 153). Price argues “This appreciative and speculative dimension of Royce’s idealism 
suggests that not only do we share the character of mind with our fellow natural beings but that we should also treat them 
as ends in themselves rather than means to our own ends,” and therefore “offers us a vision of living conscious 
meaningful nature… that we can and should come to view natural beings as fellow conscious beings, beings endowed 
with selfhood and intelligence” (154). While he admits that Royce does promote the “pragmatic manipulation of nature” 
and that The World and The Individual is not a “proto-environmental text” because the “obvious and irrevocable 
destruction of the natural world was just beginning to register in Royce’s day, and it is by no means obvious that it was 
registering to Royce,” Price quotes Royce’s hope that we “‘unlearn that atrocious Philistinism of our whole race which 
supposes that Nature has no worthier goal than producing a man’” and his suggestion that “beings of other consciousness 
and time spans different from our own ‘whose rationality, whose dignity, whose significance, whose power of will, whose 
aptness to pursue ideals, might be equal to or far above our own…’” as promising a richer relationship with nature (The 
World and the Individual, Vol. 2, 231 & 228; “The Appreciation of Natural Beings” 155).  
According to Price, Royce's acceptance of evolution combined with his "social theory of being" suggests "man 
and nature are not only related on a continuum of internal relation... but that the course of being per se and, thereby, the 
course of nature is moving towards a kind of 'universal Sociology'" where "we review our relations with natural beings 
and in particular reassess these relations in terms of the appreciative categories of respect and sympathy" (Studies of Good 
and Evil 206; “The Appreciation of Natural Beings” 155). He asserts that Royce's idealism entails "nature is the 
expression of mental life," thus he "characterizes natural beings as not only social but as having conscious minds, and 
these minds are said to be reaching out through time with purpose, significance, and, above all, selfhood" (“The 
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Appreciation of Natural Beings” 156). Just as we project the existence of minds onto other humans, there is nothing in 
Royce's metaphysics to prevent extending the existence of mind to other living animals and plants, and even to inorganic 
beings and processes. As a result, "all beings, whatever their natural manifestation may be, are conscious minds spread out 
through time" and the difference is not one of kind, e.g. rationality, but of the "span of this presence and its accompanying 
gestures" (157). Thus, it is our temporal limitations that inhibit our ability to communicate with other natural beings and 
to recognize their consciousness because "What we witness when we encounter and engage a fellow natural being is the 
fragment of self, a moment in the conscious life of a self, a slice or phase of consciousness better witnessed by 
considering the life span of the species rather than this or that individual" (The World and the Individual, Vol. 2, 241; 
“The Appreciation of Natural Beings” 157). 
While Price admits Royce probably saw our temporal limitations as insurmountable, he is thrilled by these 
panpsychastic possibilities and argues that Royce both overestimated the temporal incongruity between ourselves and 
natural beings and provided resources for overcoming any apparent incommensurability. Price references William James' 
influence on Royce's philosophy of time, specifically their shared notion of the "specious present" where the present 
moment is experienced "as a serial whole, within which there are observed temporal differences of former and latter" (The 
World and the Individual, Vol. 2, 122) and the possibility of experiencing time as "world-embracing" where "this present, 
whether it is the present second, or the present century, or the present geological period, it is... truly a divisible and 
connected whole region of time, within which a succession of events take place[...] within whose span the whole universe 
of present events is comprised." (The World and the Individual, Vol. 2, 128; “The Appreciation of Natural Beings” 160) 
This world-embracing implies we experience time as both an objective and quantitative succession of measurable changes 
as well as a subjective and qualitative perception of events. Our subjective experience of time is plastic and can be 
stretched to span periods of time that our finite lives could not experience objectively, e.g. imagining historical events or 
geological processes. This "spandedness" of time is crucial for Royce's philosophy of loyalty in general since the 
individual develops her identity through loyalty to a community and/or cause that transcends her temporal limitations and, 
clearly, individuals can also develop these spanded relationships with natural beings. Price uses the example of his 
relationship to the oak tree in his front yard where his life span and the tree's inhibit their ability to communicate but do 
not altogether prevent meaningful transaction because "Royce maintains that the self-manifesting presence of the oak is an 
act of communication on the part of the oak tree or the oak species even if we have a very vague idea about its inner life 
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and the language it uses to discourse" and "Presumably the same could be said of animals, insects, rivers, clouds, and 
perhaps the whole planet" (“The Appreciation of Natural Beings” 160-162).  
With the possibility of communication established through the overcoming of incongruent time via spandedness 
achieved, Price articulates his own vision of community with natural beings. Communing with nature requires two things: 
first we must develop a "deeper appreciation between we human beings and all other natural beings" and second we must 
recognize that "we can learn from them, that their presence alone is a communicative act, that perhaps some opening and 
shared communicative space is not only possible but actual, and that there is some possibility of experiencing their inner 
lives and personhood" (162). Price describes this process as follows: 
The quantitative limit of temporal span is a limit of our attention to facts but it is not necessarily a limitation on 
 our appreciative attention to values and affections like beauty, love, care, and sympathy. I suggest that the 
 convergence of human beings and natural beings in the pervasive character of social being... implies that in the 
 mode of appreciation, we share not quantity and measure but pathos with nature... we must strive to lengthen not 
 our attention span but to attain sympathos with intelligence, a synthesis of feeling... Only the transposition of our 
 affective-appreciative life into nature will open up the possibilities of making contact with natural beings. (163) 
 
Conversely, Royce fails to recognize these possibilities because when he "looks to encounter natural beings socially, he 
invokes not the world of appreciation... but the world of description" which "veils the internal relations of the present and 
thereby prevents the intrinsically valuable world of natural beings from affecting a deeper register of our own social 
nature" (163-164). Without developing this subjective appreciation of nature, we, like Royce, are more likely to reduce 
natural beings to measure and commodity rather than viewing them as members of our social community.  
 Finally, Price argues Royce comes closest to recognizing nature as social in his epistemological arguments against 
solipsism. According to Price, Royce argues that "External reality is a function of our belief in our fellow human beings" 
because "our involvement with one another leads us to believe that we are each conscious finite minds because other 
human beings present us with meaning different from our own... [they] are the source of new and novel ideas that do not 
spring from our subjectivity" (164).  Likewise, Royce extends this argument to human bodies since they are "instruments 
of social communication" and consequently to the "rest of physical nature" (165) because if "one's fellow is real, the 
whole of the phenomenal nature from which his phenomenal presence is continuous must be real in the same general 
fashion" (Studies of Good and Evil, 228). Price concludes by saying that "To be real in this sense is to be a finite 
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conscious being," thus all of nature possesses finite consciousness and waits "for the one who will question it and open the 
lines of communication" (“The Appreciation of Natural Beings” 166).  
Jason M. Bell (1999) builds upon the frameworks created by Oppenheim and Price by claiming Royce's loyalty to 
loyalty requires loyalty to nature. Like Selk, Bell begins with Royce's theory of personhood, specifically that an individual 
develops her identity through her membership in and participation with a community. Loyalty binds individuals and 
communities together and at last "unify[s] the self with the world" (“The World and Its Selves” 169). Because individual 
loyalties conflict and disparate communities conflict over different loyalties, we must ultimately be loyalty to loyalty as a 
means of arbitrating conflicting loyalties and because we must recognize our own fallibilism, i.e. that other individuals 
and communities may, in the past, present, or future, be more successful at achieving the Great Community (169-170). 
Bell argues this philosophy of loyalty requires loyalty to the "environmental cause" as follows: 
I will define the "environmental cause" as a commitment to the continued health of the relationships that exist in 
 nature (the totality of all personal beings in the world) and among individual natural beings, and an opposition to 
 plans that would undermine the breadth and depth of these relationships. Environmentalism is a loyalty, that is to 
 say, to the relationships that exist, have existed, and will exist between the personal beings in nature (and indeed, 
 it is loyalty to the person of nature itself), and it is a recognition that these relationships form a community of 
 which we are a part. (171) 
Bell goes even further saying that the central problem both environmentalists and the philosophy of loyalty hope to 
address is identical: "how can humans be rid of selfish desires so that they are not injurious to larger community?" (171). 
Thus, loyalty to loyalty requires loyalty to nature and if we are not, we risk the "moral suicide" of our own extinction in 
the long run and undermine the loyalties active in nature in the present (171-172).1 
 With this connection between loyalty to loyalty and loyalty to nature established, Bell refurbishes Royce's 
philosophy of loyalty from an ecological perspective. First, Bell agrees with Price's suggestion that the "narrow, human 
quantification of time is actually a disloyalty that prevents persons with different life spans from communicating with one 
another" and that overcoming this limited temporal perspective, i.e. selfishness, through loyalty to a being with a longer 
temporal perspective, whether a social or natural being, is necessary to become an ethical person (“The World and Its 
Selves” 173). Likewise, he sees Royce as consistent with environmental pragmatists Jim Cheney's & Anthony Weston's 
“Environmental Ethics as Environmental Etiquette” (1999) appeal that an "adequate environmental ethics should begin 
with ethics, rather than epistemology" because we are already enmeshed in a web of ecological, social, and, consequently, 
ethical relationships prior to our attempts to know the natural world (“The World and Its Selves” 174). This primacy of 
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ethics over epistemology overcomes the dominant anthropocentrism-biocentrism axiology in environmental ethics 
because first Royce's absolutism and panpsychism emphasize "there are no essential distinctions between any two finite 
beings" contra anthropocentrism. Second, Royce's emphasis on communal value for individual humans as well as natural 
beings undercuts the biocentric need to establish the intrinsic value of natural beings (174-176). Bell summarizes as 
follows: 
  As individuals, we represent a slice of time in an evolutionary processive community, and thus a person 
 represents the values of individuals who preceded it and contains within itself the possibility of future individuals 
 and future values. When we destroy a species or an ecosystem, we undermine loyalty in this communal sense. If 
 we eliminate a species, we do not simply undermine the loyalties of that individual but also all that could have 
 come from these loyalties. (176) 
Thus, Royce's commitment to panpsychism and communal value helps us to see ourselves as existing in a web of natural 
loyalties and requires us to privilege our ethical responsibilities to our local ecosystems and ultimately to the biosphere.    
 After completing this ecological retrofit of Royce's philosophy of loyalty, Bell defines the criterion for applying 
loyalty to nature to environmental problems. First, we should not "interfere in the nonhuman world solely for the good of 
humans" because our actions may "undermine the loyal plans that nonhuman natural beings possess in their own 
communities" thus "All human actions that have an impact on the natural world must support the plans, persons, 
communities, and loyalties of the natural world" (177). Second, we must avoid absolute loyalties that undermine natural 
loyalties because we can only "hope that our cause will lead to good, but if it does not we want to be certain that other 
causes will be able to do good in our place" thus we have a responsibility to "'harmonize apparent conflicting loyalties, 
and to remove the conflict of loyalties from the world, and to utilize even conflict, where it is inevitable, so as to further 
general loyalty'” (Philosophy of Loyalty 85; “The World and Its Selves” 178). This desire for harmony should lead us to 
cooperate with one another and to "teach the ecological truth of the world and contradict the notion of individual 
supremacy" (179). Finally, Royce contends that our loyalties are most effective when most idealized, i.e. "when the 
goodness of a plan is understood to be applicable to communities wider than our own, when the cause will outlive even 
our own deaths," which Bell argues is best exemplified by communities "whose religion, mythology, and community have 
always recognized the dependence of the community on living nature" (179). He laments that this awareness of 
dependence is lacking in communities descended from European settler colonialism which "have mostly rejected 
mythology and replaced it with analytical, scientific understanding that is often not aware of its own dependence on the 
ideal world," however Royce's attentiveness to grief provides a valuable corrective (179). Idealization often occurs 
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through "loss and grief" and Bell reminds us that "Many environmental loyalists arrive at their devotion to nonnatural 
being because of grief that is experienced when species and ecosystems are made extinct through human interference" 
thus "devotion is strengthened even despite loss" and "even in loss the possibility for good" can be found (179).  
 Before concluding his argument, Bell addresses the problem of loyal killing. He admits "Humans often disloyally 
destroy each other, nonhuman species, and ecosystems," that "most killing of animals as currently carried out is disloyal 
to loyalty," and that consequently "many environmentalists doubt that it is possible to kill loyally" (180). In response, Bell 
contends that "the killing of a loyal creature can be loyally accomplished so long as the killing supports and does not 
permanently undermine the purposes of the community whose member will be killed" (180). Perhaps the problem of loyal 
killing cannot be ultimately resolved without voluntary human extinction, but Bell cites the natural predator-prey 
relationships that balance ecosystems as the most ideal example and insists that humans are "less in danger of killing 
disloyally when we attach personal significance to the killing," e.g. thanking the "spirit of the just-killed animal" by 
Native American hunters, the Christian tradition of saying "grace to thank their God for their meals," "free-range" meat, 
vegetarianism, and Jewish dietary laws (181). These strategies ameliorate the inevitable damage of human existence while 
supporting the loyalties within nature and allowing humans to pursue finite communal loyalties in balance with our 
idealized loyalty to nature. In conclusion, by "being loyal to loyalty, we cast our loyalty into the natural world-- beyond 
the needs and desires of humans considered alone, beyond, in fact, even the temporal span that the consciousness of our 
species possesses individually or corporately." Thus, "This theory requires us to respect the potentiality of infinite ideal 
value, and thus loyalty to this ideal value of nature in the present is obligatory for all who would be loyal in the present" as 
well as the "distant future... even if its actuality will not be experienced by any creature currently alive" (183).  
 Turning from Royce's philosophy of loyalty, Ben A. Minteer constructs his environmental philosophy by 
appealing to Royce's concept of the wise province as exemplified by Benton MacKaye his vision of the Appalachian Trail 
and his contributions to the American wilderness idea. He argues that MacKaye's "pragmatic vision for wilderness 
conservation, a project supported through an appeal to the values of a reconstructed "indigenous" communal environment, 
owes much to the social philosophy of Josiah Royce, MacKaye's former teacher at Harvard" (“Wilderness and the Wise 
Province” 185). According to Minteer, the influence of Royce is evident in MacKaye's "An Appalachian Trail: A Project 
in Regional Planning" (Journal of the American Institute of Architects, 1921) where he originally debuts his vision for 
what has become "one of the most culturally-valued and successful wilderness projects of the 20th century: a 2,100 mile 
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long Appalachian Trail running from Maine to Georgia." MacKaye adapted Royce's wise provincialism to envision a trail 
that would integrate the "institutional and cultural features of the human community with the natural landscape" 
(“Wilderness and the Wise Province”186). Like Aldo Leopold, MacKaye saw conservation as an "ethical project" and, 
like Royce, "he significantly avoided the appeal to a set of moral goods ontologically and epistemologically removed from 
lived cultural experience" (187). 
 Minteer identifies Royce's concept of wise provincialism as articulated in his Phi Beta Kappa address at the 
University of Iowa as the most significant influence on MacKaye's environmental philosophy. In this address, Royce 
applies his philosophy of loyalty at the level of the local province and uses this "semantically rich concept" to negotiate 
the "interdependent relationship between local and global loyalties" in the face of rapid social change (188). Minteer cites 
the following excerpt as a definition: 
  For me, then, a province shall mean any one part of a national domain, which is geographically and 
 socially, sufficiently unified to have a true consciousness of its own unity, to feel a pride in its own ideas and 
 customs, and to possess a sense of its distinction from other parts of the country. And by the term “provincialism” I 
 shall mean, first, the tendency of such a province to possess its own customs and ideals; secondly, the totality of 
 these customs and ideal themselves; and thirdly, the love and pride which lead the inhabitants of a province to 
 cherish as their own these traditions, beliefs, and aspirations. (Minteer 188, Royce Basic Writings, vol. 2, 1069) 
Minteer insists Royce's "intriguing expression of the material manifestation of provincial goods also suggests an 
understanding of the close connections between community life and environmental quality" which Benton MacKaye 
shared as well as contemporary communitarian environmentalists like, Mark Sagoff (188).  
 According to Minteer, Royce saw wise provincialism as a means of ameliorating three emerging social problems 
that continue to this day and are increasingly associated with environmental philosophy: 1) the "social alienation" of "both 
foreign immigrants and domestic 'wanderers,'" 2) the "leveling tendency" of both American life in particular and 
globalism in general whereby provincial cultures are "run through the homogenizing meat grinder of modern civilization," 
and 3) the "explosion of the 'mob spirit' and its polluting effects upon popular democratic governance" (189). Although 
Minteer notes that Royce "never came close to offering anything programmatic with respect to the planning and 
maintenance of such communities" he "identified a very real set of threats to the communal virtues of the American 
province" and inspired "concrete proposals " like MacKaye's Appalachian Trail (190). In fact, MacKaye's proposal 
indirectly addresses these problem of modern society with a "plea for an improved recreation aesthetic" and suggests that 
"the 'reposeful study' of natural process along the Trail would encourage individuals to evaluate the crass commercialism 
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and industrialism of American life, and that the experience of wild nature would revitalize our productive relations," or 
what Bryan Norton calls the "'transformative value' of experiences in the natural world" (192-193). MacKaye also 
intended the Trail to function as a site of resistance against encroaching modern urbanism as part of the "smaller and more 
organic 'regional city,' conceived and planned in a larger geographic context" that functions as a "bulwark against the 
'leveling effects' of modern civilization afflicting the false metropolitan form" (193). Most importantly, MacKaye hoped 
the Trail would be "but the entrance to the final thing we seek-- that thing eternal which we have called primeval 
influence," or a what Minteer describes as a "decentralized, green vision for an aesthetically, politically, and ecologically 
reconstructed urban and rural environment" (MacKaye, MP, box 184, folder 40; Minteer 195).   
 Finally, Daniel J. Brunson argues Royce's philosophies of nature, loyalty, and insurance requires commitments to 
sustainability. Although Brunson does not cite the articles from The Personalist Forum (1999), he makes similar appeals 
to Royce's philosophy of nature, specifically that our "conception of nature is itself derived from our social lives" and that 
the most relevant differences between humans and, to use Price's terminology, natural beings is that "nature speaks 
different languages" and "time-scale" (“Insuring an Indefinite Future” 118-120). In fact, Brunson has the luxury of citing 
previously unavailable scientific discoveries (like the "identifying whistles of dolphins," the "waggle dance" of bees, and 
plant pheromones) which support Royce's "contention that we have always been participants in a broader social order of 
nature" (119). Next, Brunson turns to Royce's philosophy of loyalty and highlights its relevance not only to moral 
perfectionism, but also to the physical and mental health of the individual and the community, citing several passages 
from Philosophy of Loyalty, such as: 
  "The care of health, self-cultivation, self-control, spiritual power-- these are all to be morally estimated with 
 reference to the one principle [of loyalty to loyalty]." (Philosophy of Loyalty 143, Brunson 121) 
 "Helping the people to the attainment and preservation of their powers obviously involves the sort of care of 
 public  health... which our philanthropists and teachers and public-spirited people generally regard as important." 
 (Philosophy of Loyalty 216-17, Brunson 122) 
"...if you want to train a man to a good life, you must indeed do what you can to give him health and power." 
(Philosophy of Loyalty  218, Brunson 122) 
 
These statements combined with the philosophy of loyalty's implicit commitment to the general well being of fellow 
community members and the members of other communities requires our present "attention to broad and long-term 
environmental factors" of our current decisions. Furthermore, Brunson contends this obligation requires us to "simultaneously 
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respond to the often unwitting consequences of choices made decades or centuries ago and strive to consider how the choices 
we make now affect future generations" (“Insuring an Indefinite Future”122). While this explication of the philosophy of 
loyalty alone grounds a commitment to sustainability, Brunson concludes by appealing to Royce's political philosophy in War 
and Insurance (1914) which explicitly states that "international insurance should include calamities other than war, such as 
earthquakes, volcanoes, migratory pestilences, hurricanes, and famines" which are on the rise due to anthropogenic climate 
change (123). Thus, while "Royce could not have foreseen the human role in natural calamities... His loyal hope for the great 
community requires us to take practical action now to ensure the very possibility of that community's future" (123). 
 As can be seen, Royce's philosophy enables a variety of approaches to environmental philosophy and several of these 
methodologies reframe the anthropocentrism-biocentrism axiology from a pragmatic perspective. Selk makes a compelling 
case for why Royce's philosophy of loyalty requires a commitment to nature based on the needs of future generations, but this 
strategy commits Royce to an anthropocentric approach and mires any latent insights. Thus, the later approaches prove more 
interesting because they link Royce's philosophy to nature, not merely as a resource to be preserved for future generation but 
as an aggregate of fellow social beings to whom we have moral obligations. At the level of ontology, Oppenheim shows how 
Royce's idealism does not reinforce the bifurcation of the cosmos that reduces nature to mere matter to be transcended by the 
mind or spirit, but rather presents a theology of immanence that embraces naturalism and sees nature as a fellow participant in 
our attempts to grow spiritually and epistemologically. Likewise, Price further articulates how the panpsychist implications of 
Royce's idealism makes communing with nature not only a real possibility but an important part of our self development. 
While Royce's panpsychism may seem counterintuitive and a thorough analysis or defense is beyond the scope of this venue, 
the hypothesis has a venerable history and has experienced a revival since the publication of David Chalmers "Facing Up to 
the Hard Problem of Consciousness" (1995). Furthermore, the probability that nature is more conscious than assumed is 
bolstered by the evidence of communication and social behavior among plants and animals referenced by Brunson. Finally, 
Bell and Brunson provide compelling applications of Royce's philosophy of loyalty and insurance to ground our moral 
obligations to natural beings and sustainability, respectively. Finally, Minteer's exploration of Royce's influence on MacKaye's 
regional planning philosophy highlights Royce's relevance to bioregionalism. Thus, Royce provides anthropocentric, 
theocentric, biocentric, and bioregionalist arguments for why individuals should be loyal to nature, but he also provides 
egocentric reasons for why an individual should be loyal to nature based on moral perfectionism as can be seen through a brief 
comparison with the latent environmental philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. 
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Loyalty to the Earth: Nietzsche's Latent Environmental Philosophy: 
 In the prologue of Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1891), Friedrich Nietzsche's protagonist proclaims "I swear to you, my 
brothers, stay loyal to the earth and do not believe those who speak to you of otherworldly hopes! ... The most dreadful thing 
is now to sin against the earth" (Thus Spoke Zarathustra Prologue 3). Critical disagreement abounds on how to interpret this 
bold statement and its promise of developing a robust environmental philosophy from Nietzsche's work: some argue it is a 
statement of biospheric egalitarianism (Hallman 1991, Nixon 1998, Parkes 1998),  others that he is an "aristocratically 
individualistic 'high humanist'" who sees exploitation as necessary for the will to power (Acampora 1994),  and others suggest 
he goes beyond the anthropocentric-biocentric axiology (Drenthen 2002) to occupy a space parallel to Chinese Daoism or 
Mahāyāna Buddhism (Parkes 2005). 
 The first scholar to highlight Nietzsche's latent environmentalism, Max O. Hallman (1991), argues that "While some 
of Nietzsche's more infamous concepts... may be superfluous or perhaps even antithetical to the development of an 
ecologically oriented, environmentally concerned philosophizing , he does address certain theoretical questions concerning 
humanity's relationship to the natural world, and he does so in the context of criticizing traditional Western thinking for being 
anti-natural, for failing to "remain faithful to the earth" (“Nietzsche’s Environmental Ethics” 100). As a result, Nietzsche 
shares "certain affinities to the ecosystem approach of modern ecologists... especially those who have been classified as deep 
ecologists," specifically 1) the rejection of a "transcendent world" and a critique of "traditional Western philosophical and 
religious thinking for being 'otherworldly' and 'anti-natural,'" 2) a rejection of the "human-nature dichotomy" and the 
anthropocentrism of Western thought, 3) his formulation of the will to power as a "principle that explains change immanently 
and that suggests the interrelatedness of all living things," and 4) his call for a "'return to nature'-- a return whereby the anti-
natural tendencies of traditional Western thinking are dispossessed" (100-101).  
 Hallman supports these claims through a sustained comparison of Nietzsche's critique of Christianity with a similar 
critique by ecological historian Lynn White, Jr. (101-106) and by showing that Nietzsche shares more with "deep ecologists" 
like Arne Naess, Bill Devall, and George Sessions than with "reformist ecologists" like John Passmore (106-119). More 
importantly, Hallman presents Nietzsche's will to power as compatible with the ecological demand championed by Thomas 
Colwell, et al.,2 that "we can no longer view the natural world as dead matter in motion,... Rather, nature must be seen as a 
living, growing, decaying process, and sometimes perhaps even as a living, breathing, organism" (119). According to 
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Hallman, Nietzsche recognizes the "interdependency of all living things, as well as the importance of environmental factors in 
the determination of human and nonhuman life" and that "the world itself must be viewed as a gigantic system of interacting 
forces" i.e. "a 'monster of energy' that is continually forming and reforming, continually creating and recreating, itself" (120-
122). Thus, humanity must return to nature and thorough amour fati, love of fate, we become "wholehearted participants in 
the joyous game of creation and recreation" (124).  By "No longer seeking to escape from the Earth and earthly existence, we 
are finally able to live fully in the natural world, to rest, as Zarathustra so beautifully says, 'near the earth, faithful, trusting, 
waiting, tied to it with the softest threads'" (125). 
 Conversely, Ralph R. Acampora (1994) warns against Hallman's maverick interpretation and argues that Nietzsche's 
latent "biospheric egalitarianism" runs contrary to and is outweighed by his "strong vision of aristocratic individualism" 
(“Using and Abusing Nietzsche…” 187). Acampora disagrees with Hallman for the following reasons: 1) Hallman's textual 
evidence is selective and relies on the "continual citation of a notoriously dubious text," the unfinished and posthumous The 
Will to Power 2) Nietzsche's "fairly obvious elitism" 3) in Beyond Good & Evil, Nietzsche explicitly states that "Exploitation" 
is a necessary condition of the will to power because "it belongs to the essence of what lives, as a basic organic function; it is a 
consequence of the will to power, which is after all the will of life" (Sec. 259), and 4) Nietzsche's ridicule of the Stoics for 
desiring to live "According to nature" (Beyond Good and Evil, Sec. 9; “Using and Abusing Nietzsche…” 188-190). Acampora 
admits Nietzsche may "anticipate some aspects of contemporary ecology" due to his "naturalistic transcendentalism," i.e. that 
humanity is "basically a natural phenomenon" which possesses the potential to "transcend, or 'make more' of, their ordinary 
conditions," but "whatever eco-natural holism Nietzsche may embrace, it is a variety that does not preclude the possibility... of 
hierarchical visions or transcendental aspirations" (“Using and Abusing Nietzsche…” 191-192). Furthermore, Hallman's use 
of amor fati glosses over the fact that nature is destructive as well as creative (193). In conclusion, Acampora agrees that 
Nietzsche provides an important critique  of Western culture and perhaps some other resources for ecophilosophers, but 
Hallman's presentation of Nietzsche as a biospheric egalitarian is a caricature that misappropriates Nietzsche’s ideas.  
 Subsequent scholarship on Nietzsche's latent environmentalism has either attempted to bolster Hallman's 
interpretation or present an alternative. Andrew Nixon (1998) supports Hallman by referencing Nietzsche's biography, minor 
works, and intellectual influences. It is well know that Nietzsche "had a strong affinity, perhaps reverence, for nature" from a 
young age and that throughout his life he "continued to find solace and inspiration in nonhuman nature." (“Nietzsche and 
Environmental Ethics” 73-74) In fact, after retiring from his position at Basel he would "spend six to eight hours a day, when 
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not indisposed by illness, hiking though pine woods and around alpine lakes" (Parkes “Nietzsche’s Environmental 
Philosophy” 1999, 169). Nietzsche expresses this fondness in a lecture delivered at Basel entitled "On the Future of Our 
Educational Institutions": 
 If you want to lead a young person onto the right path of education and culture, be careful not to disturb his naively 
 trustful and personally immediate relationship with nature...in this way he will unconsciously sympathize with the 
 metaphysical oneness of all things in the great metaphor of nature, and at the same time calm himself with their 
 eternal perseverance and necessity. (“On the Future of Our Educational Institution” 95-96) 
Furthermore, Nixon claims Nietzsche's "affinity for nature also has literary roots, manifest in his unfaltering admiration for the 
transcendentalists Goethe and Emerson," specifically Emerson's commission in the essay Nature for a "reunion of human and 
nonhuman nature, beckoning us to 'enjoy an original relation to the universe’” (Emerson Essays and Lectures 7; Nixon 
“Nietzsche and Environmental Ethics” 75). Thus, this evidence "further reinforces that for Nietzsche nature was no peripheral 
subject matter, but a lifelong passion and philosophical preoccupation" (“Nietzsche and Environmental Ethics” 75).  
 In direct response to Acampora, Nixon argues Nietzsche's perspectivism and experimentalism undermine attempts to 
present Nietzsche as exclusively an aristocratic individualist. According to Nixon, perspectivism "underscore[s] the absurdity 
of any claim to human dominion over nonhuman nature" and Nietzsche was fond of using the perspective of animals to 
expose the folly of human behavior and beliefs (“Nietzsche and Environmental Ethics” 77). Likewise, Nietzsche's 
experimentalism suggests his work is primarily deconstructive of received assumptions and any apparent constructive or 
systematic ideas, like the übermensch or his elitism, are experimental rather than dogmatic (78). Furthermore, this 
experimentalism gives us license to appropriate or dismiss Nietzsche's ideas as we construct our own experiments according 
to our current needs (79). Finally, he contends that Nietzsche's praise of sublimation, "a process by which the quality of the 
will to power is transformed into something more positive" implies that while exploitation may be a necessary condition of the 
will to power “one’s ascent to a state of satisfactory power in which one can afford to be ‘noble,’ need not be barbaric or 
exploitative” (80). Indeed, Nietzsche himself states “how much injury [one] can endure without suffering from it becomes the 
actual measure of [one’s] wealth” (Genealogy of Morals 72). Nixon therefore concludes the will to power “describes a 
monistic universe that is consistent with the best evidence of contemporary science, and, accompanied by the concept of 
sublimation, appears to be consistent with the ethical goals of contemporary deep ecology” (82).  
 Others, like Martin Drenthen (2002), argue that comparing Nietzsche to contemporary discussions of environmental 
ethics is unsuccessful, not because he does not possess a latent environmental philosophy, but because he surpasses the current 
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axiology by articulating a fundamental ambiguity within humanity's relationship with nature. Nietzsche reveals that "each 
environmental ethic that relies on a particular normative concept of nature is in fact a tyranny over nature" but "this tyranny 
cannot be avoided because each morality is tyrannical and functions within the project of trying to get a grip on nature" (“The 
Paradox of Environmental Ethics” 172). Thus, Nietzsche's thought functions as "therapy for environmental ethics" where we 
constantly propose moral interpretations and interrogate them. We then revise them as we encounter "Sublime nature [which] 
withdraws itself from us... provokes wonder and... awe" and, most importantly, "reminds us of the fact that there is something 
'out there' that is valuable in a way we cannot control, identify, or possess." (172-174).  
 Likewise, Graham Parkes (2005) also laments that the initial attempts to classify Nietzsche as either a biospheric 
egalitarian or aristocratic humanist are misguided. According to Parkes, both Hallman and Acampora err by presenting the 
übermensch as an expression of aristocratic humanism that conflicts with Nietzsche's latent environmentalism. Parkes stresses 
that the übermensch represents the "possibility of a radically new way of being for the human" and is thus "profoundly 
relevant for ecological thinking" because it " requires that one go beyond the merely human perspective and transcend the 
anthropocentric world view" (“Nietzsche’s Environmental Philosophy” 81). Furthermore, Parkes contends the will to power 
does not mandate exploitation, but "manifests along a continuum with brute force at one end and world-interpretation at the 
other" (84). Nietzsche advocates neither a sentimental egalitarianism nor an elitist humanism, but a naturalization of the 
human which occurs by "encountering nature on its own terms... appalling in its indifference, [while] it is also noble-- and 
thus worthy of human emulation" (90). This naturalized human "might reasonably be expected to expend its energies 
tyrannizing itself for the sake of culture rather than tyrannizing nature for the sake of commercial profit" and through the 
"'dedivinization' of nature" may enjoy an "epiphany in which the natural world shows itself to be divine after all" (91). Parkes 
concludes that Nietzsche occupies a space similar to the Daoists and Buddhists who "rather than issuing commandments for 
ethical conduct toward the natural world, advocate certain forms of somatic practice that conduce to an experiential 
realization of its sacred nature" (91). 
 In summation, Nietzsche clearly possess a latent environmental philosophy that anticipates and in some respects 
surpasses current theoretical debates. All scholars agree that Nietzsche's critique of Western culture and Christianity indicts 
their anthropocentric assumptions and resistance to a naturalized vision of humanity's place in nature. Likewise, several of 
Nietzsche's central concepts, specifically perspectivism, the übermensch, and will to power support visions of humanity that 
lean in the direction of biospheric egalitarianism. Acampora rightfully reminds us of the strong aristocratic elements of 
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Nietzsche's thought, but given the post-structuralist tradition of Nietzsche as a destroyer of hierarchies and the critiques 
provided by Nixon, Drenthen, and Parkes, exploitation and elitism emerge as only examples of the many methods and ends of 
the will to power. Thus, when we acknowledge that nature was both a personal passion and philosophical preoccupation for 
Nietzsche, we see that encounters with nature are critical to Nietzsche's philosophy of the self and moral philosophy. Finally, 
these encounters with nature are best achieved through somatic practices, like hiking, rather than theoretical discourse, and are 
central to an individual's self-creation. If we desire to achieve ourselves, we must remain loyal to the earth. 
Loyalty to Nature: Royce & Nietzsche in Dialogue:  
At first blush, more contrast than comparisons appear between the philosophies of Nietzsche, an atheist and naturalist 
who exults in the individual, and Royce, a Christian Idealist who values community. Consequently, little scholarly attention 
has been paid to their parallels, but the evidence for areas of continuity between the two are intriguing and compelling. In the 
biography Josiah Royce: From Grass Valley to Harvard (1992), Robert V. Hine briefly mentions Nietzsche in the context of 
Royce’s interest in theories of the will and their relation to his philosophy of the self. Although Heine focuses more on Arthur 
Schopenhauer’s influence than Nietzsche, it should be noted that Schopenhauer was also a major influence on Nietzsche 
(173). Thus, both Royce’s and Nietzsche’s theories of the will and self are in part responses to Schopenhauer.  Oppenheim 
presents the most thorough examination of the parallels between Royce and Nietzsche and considers Nietzsche to be a major, 
if unexpected dialogue partner of Royce, particularly as he formulates his mature ethics (Royce’s Mature Ethics 178). Royce 
first references Nietzsche around 1900 and continues throughout his late work, including both his book The Philosophy of 
Loyalty (1908) and his “Problem of Truth” (1908) article. Naturally, Royce criticizes Nietzsche’s “excessive individuality,” 
but finds his contributions interesting enough to devote an entire article published posthumously that “analyze[s] the heart of 
the ethical teachings found in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Beyond Good and Evil, Genealogy of Morals, and Anti-Christ” making 
Royce “among the first Americans to call public attention to the importance of Nietzsche” (189).  
According to Oppenheim, Royce and Nietzsche share the assumption that “Ethics studies how a human self should 
direct its personal energy within our fluxing universe” and the presupposition that “conventional (or herd) morality failed to 
meet the required standard” because “authentic ethics has to lie primarily, not in conformism, but in autonomous decision 
making,” i.e. voluntarism (Royce’s Mature Ethics 189). Likewise, Royce praises Nietzsche for identifying “three basic 
quandaries that need increasingly personal and authentic answers if decision making is to be genuine,” (189) specifically: “(1) 
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Who am I and what do I want? (2) What does this will that seeks power genuinely desire?” and “how, then, should a noble 
self that seeks perfection relate to the fluxing universe around it?” (“Nietzsche” 322; Royce’s Mature Ethics 190). Royce 
initiates his late ethics with similar questions3 and Nietzsche’s contrast between noble and slave morality may have been an 
“unacknowledged source for his distinction in the Problem of Christianity between at least the first two of his three 
fundamental ‘attitudes of will’ (self-assertion, self-negation, and genuine loyalty)” (Royce’s Mature Ethics 191-192). 
In summation, Oppenheim identifies three areas of consilience and three areas of divergence between the two 
philosophers. First, despite Royce’s communitarianism, Royce “delighted in Nietzsche’s individualism because he himself 
increasingly emphasized the individualization of the self” in his late work (192). Second, Royce echoes the Nietzschean theme 
of struggle, specifically the “need to bear life’s tragedies and to endure the ostracism and downdrag of the ‘herd’” (192). 
Third, Royce “so purified loyalty… that he focused his ethics directly on only the few authentically moral selves” that it 
approaches Nietzsche’s ethics of the übermensch (192). As for disagreement, Oppenheim first cites Royce’s appreciation for 
the “richness of one’s personal and cultural past” as conflicting with Nietzsche’s contempt for “past happiness, virtues, 
reasoning, and conventional moderation” (193). Second, Royce places "each human self in communities and held that their 
universal processing is guided by a pathfinding Spirit of Interpretation-- not a Nietzschean "dead God" but an immanent and 
transcendent Spirit of the Universal Community" (193). Finally, Royce's "genuinely loyal selves must love and promote every 
human self" whereas there remains a "fundamental hostility operating between Nietzsche's nobles and slaves" (193).  
Nevertheless, Oppenheim insists that "Nietzsche played a considerable role as dialogue-partner with Royce in the latter's final 
decade of thought" (193).  
 In fact, Rossella Fabbrichesi (2009) further minimizes the divergence between Royce's and Nietzsche's theory of the 
individual and community. In "The Body of Community: Peirce, Royce, and Nietzsche," she argues these philosophers share 
similar communitarian versions of the self due to their rejection of the Cartesian Ego , i.e. identifying the "mind with the will, 
the pure consciousness, with rationality and interiority," in exchange for a semiotic self where the "identity of man resides in 
the consistency of what he does and thinks, and this consistency is expressed through a system of signs, and translated into 
habits and praxes, that are never completely individual or idiosyncratic... thus, from a sort of alterity, the alterity of the 
external signs in which his personhood is exposed and extended" ("The Body of Community: Peirce, Royce, and Nietzsche" 
2). Although the previous description of the self is more Peircian, Peirce's semiotics strongly influenced Royce's philosophy of 
the self and is consistent with Royce's more concrete view of the self where "the real self is the community, and, loving my 
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Beloved Community, I love my real self, myself in others, myself in that third other represented by the mediation of a public 
interpretation" (4). Fabbrichesi links Royce to Nietzsche by suggesting that Royce's Beloved Community functions as an 
übermensch, a concrete ideal or project, through which the individual develops her identity (6). Fabbrichesi also highlights the 
communitarian aspects of Nietzsche's thought, such as sublimation, his admiration of the Greek polis, and subsequent 
examples of esprit de corps where a group demonstrates the ability to perform a "single organism, a corporate entity" (7). She 
concludes that Royce's "'Hope of the Great Community'... means the Hope of a 'Great Politics' and, thus, of the "Great Health" 
" (8).  
 At this juncture, a summary and assessment of the agreement and disagreement between Nietzsche and Royce must be 
established. Both share understandings of the will shaped by their reading of Schopenhauer and their philosophies of the self 
seek to uncover the moral criterion an individual should adopt in order to experience their best possible life. Indeed, Royce 
praises Nietzsche's perfectionism in the final lines of his posthumous essay saying "no one has better expressed in recent times 
than he the ideal of the search for a consciousness of perfection" (“Nietzsche” 331). Although this combination of voluntarism 
and perfectionism plays out differently in their writings the differences between the two are reconcilable. Both demand the 
individual courageously participate in a process of interpretation amongst a community, including allies and rivals, and nature 
is a crucial member of that community. Both Nietzsche's übermensch and Royce's Great Community require equitable 
encounters with nature if they are to be achieved and projects like MacKaye's Appalachian Trail provides sites where we 
create our individual and communal identities through voluntary transaction with our biotic community, the animals, plants, 
and land who share our province. As such, it unites the hopes of Nietzsche and Royce.  
 More importantly, their contrasts provide important correctives to one another. Although Royce's fallibilism weakens 
the most vicious anthropocentric elements of his Christian Idealism, Nietzsche's sustained critique of the predatory nature of 
European culture and its descendants reinforces the need to embrace the contributions of non-European culture or at the least 
for European communities to renew their commitment to sustainability, conservation, and/or stewardship lest they perpetuate 
their historical cultural mandates to subdue nature. Likewise, Royce balances Nietzsche's aristocratic high humanism by 
showing how both self-interests and attempts at perfectionism inevitably lead to communitarianism. Royce presents his best 
articulation of this implication in The Sources of Religious Insight where he states that Nietzsche's egoism is ultimately a 
"social insight" because "It comes through noting that, even if the individual needs his social world as a means of grace and a 
gateway to salvation, the social order, in its turn, needs individuals that are worth saving, and can never be saved unless it 
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expresses itself through the deeds and the inner life of souls deeply conscious of the dignity of self-hood, of the infinite worth 
of unique and intensely conscious personal life" (The Sources of Religious Insight 60). Consequently, this social insight can be 
applied to nature as well and lean Nietzsche more in the direction of biocentric egalitarianism because a similar symbiotic 
relationship exists between the individual and community on the one hand and natural beings on the other. To rephrase the 
above quotation through the lens of this analogy, humanity can never be saved unless it expresses itself through deeds and the 
inner life of souls deeply conscious of the dignity of natural beings, of the infinite worth of the unique and intensely conscious 
natural world. We must become loyal to nature if we are to survive the current century. Thus, the anthropocentric-biocentric 
axiology is revealed to be a false dualism that emphasizes the division between the human individual and the natural world, 
rather than their essential unity. 
 In conclusion, Royce's philosophy provides profound resources for grounding our moral obligation to nature and 
understanding our ecological responsibilities. Royce's ontology demands we recognize ourselves as individuals enmeshed in 
an inherently social and conscious natural world that is responsive to our transactions. We become ourselves through these 
social interactions with fellow members of our species, by communing with other natural beings, and through somatic 
exercises and encounters. We find meaning by transcending the finitude of our individual lives through our commitment not 
only to human communities and projects but to the land and the fellow natural beings that inhabit it. By honoring the land and 
our fellow natural beings we recognize the need to perfect ourselves, through practices like ethical eating and voluntary 
simplicity, and our communities, through our commitments to regional planning and sustainability, lest we be guilty of 
predatory loyalties. Ultimately, we recognize these loyalties extend not only to our province but to the Earth and beyond.  
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1. When Bell writes of loyalties that exist in nature he implies they are the particular ecological relationships that exist in 
any given habitat.  
2. Specifically, Thomas Colwell, Ian McHarg, René Dubos, James Lovelock, and Stephen R. L. Clark (119). 
3. “(1) In what sense can a person truly be director of his own life plan, of ‘captain of his soul’? (2) What is the human 
good that everyone seeks (in some form)? And (3) What is my duty, or what is this ‘obligation to follow some will not my 
own, to obey, to be bound by laws which are not of my own making’?” (191). 
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